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In the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah
WALTER W. SPRAGUE and UNITED
STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY
COMPANY, E~ corporation,

Respondents,

Case No.

8351

v.
BOYLES BROS. DRILLING COMPANY,
a corporation,
Appellant.

1

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATE11ENT OF· FACTS
The respondents agree generally with the Statement of Facts in the Appellant's Brief. Certain inconsistencies are noted and additional facts are called to
the Court's attention.
One of the important provisions of the agreement
between Sprague and appellant is that the appellant,
the subcontractor, wa~ to proceed with the work by
breaking the rock in a workmanlike manner and complete the same without unreasonable delay (R. 8, Par.
2).
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On page 2 of appellant's brief it is stated that the
subcontract provided for the production of the rock by
the joint efforts of appellant and Sprague. rrhis is probably the appellant's interpretation of the subcontract.
The contract speaks for itself. It is true that Sprague
was to do certain things such as procure a licemw from
the owner of the rock to enter upon the premises to
mine and remove the rock and to furnish Boyles with
sufficient compressed air to efficiently operate its drill
(R. 8, Par. 3). But said subcontract did not provide for
the production of rock by the joint efforts of appPllant
and Sprague.
On page 2 of appellant's brief it is stated that
Sprague agreed--- "to remove the rock from the quarry
as it was broken into sizes specified 'so as not to (·ause
delay' ". No such provision is contained in tl1e agreement.
The agreement does contain the following provision
in paragraph 10 pertaining to what the subcontractor
was to do, ''all secondary breaking of rock shall coincide
with hauling operations so as nort to cause delay" (R.
10).
On page 4 of appellant's brief the last sentence of
the first paragraph is not a correct statement. The pleading of appellant is entirely different as it appears in
paragraph 6, page 4 of defendant's Answer and Counterclaim (R. 14 & 15).
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Respondents dispute the statement on page 5 of
appellant's brief that there was no determination made
by the Court of the controlling issues in the case.
Although appellant's employees had some difficulties with the air compressor furnished by Sprague in
that it was difficult to start in the morning and that
tht're was clutch trouble and battery trouble during the
latter part of December, 1949, and the month of January
1950, apparently the trouble was not important to the
appellant because the actual written contract was not
executed until the 25th day of January, 1950 (R. 8). Appellant's witness, Lowery, tes~ified that there was ample
air to operate the drill which they wanted to drill with
(R. 336).
The blast of February 3, 1950, did not produce sufficient rock of the size specifjed for use on the project.
As late as July 31, 1950, a great preponderance of the
rock in the quarry was too large to meet the specifications and had to be reduced before it could be hauled
(R. 89). A very small portion of the rock in the quarry
after the blast of February 3, 1950, could be placed on
the revetment (R. 90). At that time at least eighty percent of the rock was consider1:1 bly over the weight of 350
pounds, that being the largest size which could be used,
and running up to about three tons ( R. 90).
Because the rock was not hJ·oken to the specified size,
it was necessary for Sprague's employees to sort the
rock in the pile and push the oversize rock aside to get
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to the rock which was broken to size (R. 306 & 168).
This caused delay and increased costs in loading and
hauling the rock.
:Mr. Karlsten, the man in charge of the project of
breaking rock for appellant, had never before personally
supervised or done any rock blasting where rock of the
size of 50 to 350 pounds had to be produced (R. 303). He
had never broken any rock in this particular quarry before (R. 301). He did not put any test holes and made
no tests concerning the method of breaking this rock
before the coyote hole was put in by him (R. 301).
It was respondents' theory that appellant did not
use a proper method to break rock in this quarry to
produce rock of size from 50 to 350 pounds. That the
coyote hole method used by appellant was not a workmanlike manner of proceeding with the work (R. 164 and
165). Testimony of qualified experts was offered and,
upon objection of the appellant that this testimony was
immaterial, the Court sustained the objection and appellant was prevented from introducing the evidence
(R. 164, 173, 189).
On page 6 of appellant's brief appears the statement
that Sprague made no attempt to remove any of the
contract rock from the quarry, referring to the latter
part of F'ebruary, 1950. This is not the fact. Rock could
not be moved because of restrictions on the use of the
roads (R. 169).
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On page 8 of appellant's brief there appears a statement which indicates there was no compressor in the
quarry from September 21 until October 5. This is not
the fact. rrhere was a 105 compressor in the quarry
during that period (R. 299 & 413).
There is no conflict between the two respondents.
as to elin1inate any question as to the right of recovery between the principal and the surety and any
question of who was the real party in interest, both
were made plaintiffs and two separate causes of action
were alleged in the complaint. The first cause of action
was on behalf of Sprague and the second cause of action
was on behalf of United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Company (R. 1 to 10). At the trial both plaintiffs, by
their counsel, agreed that any judgment that might be
obtained might be taken jointly in the name of both
plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs were not concerned
with prorating any recovery (R. 76).
~o

The con tract between the parties was prepared by
the appellant ( R. 405) .

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS PROPER
AND THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.

The respondents have no quarrel with appellant's
authorities cited under Point I of appellant's brief, but
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respondents do not agree with the appellant's interpretation of the agreement between Sprague and Boyles (R.
8-10).
Appellant contends that 1t performed its part of thP
contract by putting in a coyote hole tunnel 75 feet into
the face of the quarry and two wings at the end 30 feet
on each side of the tunnel and setting off a large blast
of powder and loosening the cliff of the quarry, knocking down into the quarry a large tonnage of oversize
rock and then secondarily blasting the large rock on the
surface of the pile and waitir1g until Sprague, with the
shovel in the quarry, sorted rock which could be used
and set aside or uncovered large rocks which could not
be used when appellant would then secondarily blast the
large rock to the specified size of 50 to 350 pounds. Respondents contend that such perfor1nance did not constitute the breaking of rock into sizes between 50 pounds
and 350 pounds in a workmanlike manner without unreasonable delay.
Appellant contends that the evidence establishes
that the only breach of the subcontract was that committed by the plaintiffs. This is not the fact.
Boyles started on the job in the quarry on December
18, 1949 (R. 287). The initial blast to produce rock was
not set off until F'ebruary 3, 1950. Eighty percent of
the rock knocked down was cversize (R. 90). Sprague's
difficulty on the job was his inability to get sufficient
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rock of proper size to put on the dike in the revetment
area (R. 98). Boyles had no equipment in the quarry to
segregate the rock of proper size from that of iinproper
size. They brought to the quarry in December, 1949, a
Leyner, a bar, a water pump, the water tank, four pickups, and hoses and steel and bits (R. 333). A jackhammer
was in the quarry after the blast from February 3 to
F"'ebruary 11, 1950 (R. 339). \Vhen Lowery, an employee
of Boyles, left the quarry on February 11, 1950, there
were between 400 and 600 tons of rock of acceptable size
visible in the quarry (R. 33!:)). On April 24, 1950, when
Lowery returned to the quarry, he brought to the quarry
a light plant, hoses, connections, three jackhammers, and
approximately two dozen pieces of steel (R. 341). While
there, he shot 60 holes (R. 342). Boyles had no equipment to drag down rock from the sides of the quarry
( R. 345). They had no cater pillar tractor in the quarry
for the purpose of separating the large rock from the
rock which had been reduced to size (R. 346). Nothing
was done by Boyles to get

th~

large rocks that were up

on the side of the quarry down into the quarry and, from
April 24 until May 1, 1950, the only rock which was reduced to size was that which was convenient to start
hauling (R. 347).
Hauling of rock started il' May, 1950, for only a few
days and was discontinued when all the acceptable rock
was taken from the quarry (R. 116).
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After the May hauling, Sprague brought to the quarry a Traxcavator to sort the rock in the quarry (R. 117).
Employees of Sprague attempted to break rock by pla~t
ering and shooting (R. 117). This was done by Sprague
because sufficient rock was not available to keep the
trucks operating (R. 118). r:ehese things were part of
the breaking of the rock which should have been done
by Boyles. Mrs. Fern Sprague, the wife of Walter
Sprague, kept the records on the job (R. 135). She testified in detail concerning the expenses incurred by
Sprague in the production of rock which was the obligation of Boyles. She made summaries of the various
items of expense and fully explained all the facts and
circumstances to the Court (R. 136-158).
The appellant complains of the failure of Sprague
to make the progress payme11t provided in the subcontract of 75% of the contract price of 48c per ton by April
20, 1950. This payment was not made until July 26, 1950,
and was paid by check from United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Company (R. 211). The payment was 75%
of 48c per ton for 12,200 tons of rock (R. 211). Mr.
Murray calculated the payment as if the contract had
been performed (R. 211). The respondent did not complain of the failure to make this payment on April 20,
1950 as provided 1n the con tract. The only reasonable
conclusion that can be reached is that, on that date,
Boyles knew that not sufficient rock had been broken
to justify the payment. It will be remembered that no
rock was hauled from the quarry by April 20, 1950, the
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first rock being hauled in ~lay. Boyles did not quit the
job because of the failure to make this progress payment.
They stayed on the job until October 5, 1950, more than
two months after receiving the payment.
There was some difficulty about compressed air.
Appellant complains that their employees had to handle
the compressor. ~Ir. Lowery, the man in charge of the
breaking of rock in the quarry, testified that it would be
foolish to have Sprague furnish a man to start the compressor, and put in gasoline and oil (R. 348). No request
was made of Sprague to furnish a man to do those things
(R. 348). On no occasion, when repairs to the compressor
were needed, did Sprague refuse to take steps to have
it repaired (R. 350).
On this subject of determining the materrality of a
failure to perform, the following from 'Seetion 275, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, is enlightening:
"In determining the materiality of a failure
fully to perform a promise the following circumstances are influential:
(a) The extent to which the injured party
will obtain the substantial benefit which he could
have reasonably anticipated;
(b) The extent t0 which the injured party
may be adequately compensated in damages for
lack of complete performance;
(c) The extent to which the party failing to
perform has already partly performed or made
preparations for performance;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(d) The greater or less hardship on the party
failing to perform in terminating the contract;
(e) The wilful, negligent or innocent behavior of t:he party faiiing to perform;
(f) The greater or less uncertainty that the
party failing to perform will perform the remainder of the contraet."
Under this section appears the foUowing comment:

"a. It is impossible to lay down a rule that
can be applied with mathematical exactness to
answer the problem-when does a failure to perform a promise discharge the duty to perform
the return promise for an agreed exchange. Only
such general principles based on inherent justice
of the matter as are stated in this Section can be
asserted. Where the failure is at the outset, a
very slight failure is often sufficient to discharge
the injured party. But even in that case, and more
obviously if the failu1·e of a promisor occurs after
part performance by him, the question becomes
one of degree. Both the amount he has done and
the benefit that the injured party has received are
considered. The question then to be answered is:
Will it be more conrJrmable to justice in the
particular oase to free the injured party, or, on
the other hand, to r~quire him to perform his
promise, in both cases giving him a right of action
if the failure to perform was wrongful. In the one
case damages are based on breach of the whole
contract; in the other on the loss caused by the
partial breach. While the wilfulness of the
breach, except in contracts for personal service,
may not enhance the injury, yet it does so far
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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increase the dement uf the wrongdoer that the
law is less inclined if a breach is wilful! to require
the injured party to perform."
The trial Court found that Sprague performed his
part of the contract and there is -ample evidence in the
record to sustain that fin din~-

POINT II
THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING
THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT BREAK THE ROCK INTO
CONTRACT SIZE IN A WORKMANLIKE MANNER.

Although appellant objected, and objection was sustained, to testimony offered to be given hy two experts
concerning the proper method to produce rock in this
quarry ( R. 164, 173 and 189), there is sufficient evidence
from which the Court could find that the rock was not
broken in a workmanlike manner.
After Boyles worked under the subeontract for more
than five weeks, or until February 3, 1950, the initial
blast was set off. A picture of the quarry after the blast
was set off was introduced in evidence (R. 85, Ex. 25).
This picture itself shows the ~ondition of the rock. After
this much valuable time had been consumed, rock could
not be hauled to the projec~ be0ause of the large size
of the rock and the fact that large and proper size rock
were all mixed together in the pile. Eighty percent of
the rock was oversize (R. 90). After this blast in the
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quarry of February 3, 1950, a shovel could not ~tart
loading to haul rock out to the project in sizes called for
by the contract specifications (R. 166 and 1(i7).
No atten1pt is here made to detail all the evidem·e
given at the trial on the manner in which the rock was
broken. The record is full of similar testimony. There
is ample evidence to support the finding of the Court
that the appellant did not break the rock into contract
size in a workm•anlike manner.
Several places in appellant's brief statements are
made that, after respondents started to break rock,
they did so in the same manner as did the appellant.
This is not true. Boyles put in ,a "coyote" hole in an atternpt to produce the rock. When Sprague took over,
he went up on top of the shelf above the quarry and used
a wagon drill to drill holes down into the rock and then
blasted using these holes (R. 133 and 250).

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT
THE COST TO PLAINTIFF OF PRODUCING THE ADDITIONAL ROCK EXCEEDED WHAT HE AGREED TO
PAY DEFENDANT.
The point raised by appellant applies only to the
rock produced by respondents after appellant walked
off the job in October, 1950.
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The Court did, in its written memorHndum, refer to
the cost to Sprague of breaking of rock as 45.5 cents per
ton, or a savings of 2.5 cents per ton under the contract
price (R. 23).
It is evident, from an examination of the evidence,

that, when the trial Judge in his memorandum, figured
the cost of breaking rock by Sprague, he did not consider all of the expenses of Sprague in the production
of the rock during the period after Boyles quit the job.
This Court's attention is called to Exhibits 7-P and
8-P introduced in evidence upon the testimony of F'ern
Sprague who kept the books and records for Sprague (R.
137 and 156). The original figures on the first page of
Exhibit 8 were the actual cost to Sprague of producing
rock after Boyles left the quarry. The total originally
amounted to $6,770.45. On the second page of Exhibit 8
originally appeared a credit for 1,000 tons of rock sold
to Mathews at 48 cents per ton or $480 and the original
statement figures showed as the amount owed to Sprague
by Boyles the sum of $5, 790.0!>. Mrs. Sprague explained

that it cost Sprague considerably more than 48 cents per
ton to produce the rock and that she revised the figures
. so as to give Boyles credit for the 1,000 tons of rock sold
to Mathews at the cost of producing it, or $1,185.23 (R.
138). The figures then on the first page of Exhibit 8
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were all reduced in proportion and the total reduced from
$6,770.45 to $5,585.22, which corrected figure was rarried over onto the first page of Exhibit 7-P and the corrected figures on the various detailed items as corrected
on page 1 of Exhibit 8-P to page 3 of Exhibit 7. All the
i terns of expenses of producing rock ·after Boyles left
the quarry were testified to by Mrs. Sprague and supported by documentary evidence.
It is apparent that Hon. Martin M. Larson left out
some part of his calculation-s in the first paragraph of
page 5 of his memorandum decision. Multiplying 5485
tons by 45.5 cents does not bring a result of $4,49·5.55,
nor does multiplying said 5485 tons by 48 cents bring a
result of $4,632.80.
Attention of this Court is called to the closing paragraph of Judge Larson's J.\!Iemorandum which is as follows:
"Without setting forth herein the detailed
working of in figures, and items, which we have
done from three different approaches, and working in each detail of c·xpense ·and deduction with
the variation between largest and smallest, we
find the plaintiff has been damaged in the sum
of $8,334.80 for which they are entitled to judgment against defendant, together with $2,000
attorney's fees and costs." (R. 25)
This shows a detailed and careful consideration of
the matter by the trier of the facts.
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The appellant complain., on page 30 of its brief
about the sale of 1,000 tons of rock. The subcontract
provided that, if the breaking of the rock into sizes therein provided for resulted in the production of rock of
any size which is saleable, Sprague agreed to pay Boyles
for all such rock at the rate of forty-eight cents per ton
(R. 9, Par. 7). Sprague, in his account, gave Boyles
credit for this rock which was sold to Mathews in the
sum of $1,185.23, which was credit at the cost of Sprague
in producing the rock (R. 138). This rock, which was sold
to Mathews, was in sizes of 1,000 pounds or over (R.
251). It was not rock which was acceptable to he used
on the revetment (R. 252). Mathews gave credit to
Sprague for this rock in the sum of $1,000 on a bill for
the rental.of equipment (R. 251). Certainly appeUant has
no just complaint about this.
This Court's attention is called to the exhibits,
which appellant refers to as packages and bundles on
page 33 of its brief, and which were testified to by Mrs.
Sprague (R. 141-148). The first so-called package or
bundle was Exhibit 16-P aPd was identified by Mrs.
Sprague as the weekly payrc ll records to support the
items on Exhibit 7-P. These were the records from which
she made a recap of the charges for labor used in production of rock which recap was designated as Exhibit
16 P-A (R. 146 and 147). Exhibits 16-P and 16 P-A were
for the period prior to Boyles leaving the job. Exhibits
23-P and 23 P-A were the payroll records and recap by
Mrs. Sprague of that part of the payroll which was
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charged against appellant for the period after Boyles left
the job, from September 30 to November 18, 1950 (R.
151 and 152). Respondents believe that these exhibits
and others of similar character were proper exhibits
and properly received in evidence.

POINT IV
THE COURT PROPERLY AWARDED THE PLAINTIFFS THE SUM OF $823.15 FOR INCREASED COSTS
OF LOADING AND HAULING THE ROCK.

There is ample evidence in the record to support
this finding of dmnage to the respondents. This damage occurred prior to the time when Boyles left the
quarry and was caused by the manner of the breaking
of the rock and the oversize condition of the rock which
n1ade it necessary for Sp1~ague to sort the rock, set aside
the oversize rock, which of necessity cost him added
expense for loading the trucks, and the truck drivers
were delayed because of the lack of rock of available
size to be loaded on the trucks and this made it necessary to pay the truckers an increased amount per ton
for hauling the rock.
Mrs. Sprague prepared Exhibit 31-P. She prepared
this from the records of Sprague. This exhibit shows the
average cost to Sprague of loading when Boyles was producing rock as compared with the average cost to
Sprague of loading when Sprague was producing rock
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(R. 157). It cost Sprague 12.9 cents per ton more to
load while Boyles was in the quarry producing rock. This
item alone amounts to $823.15 for 6381 tons broken by
Boyles after the trouble wii-h the truckers. There is
ample evidence that there were delays caused by Boyles
not having rock ready to be hauled (R. 111, 167, 168).
In addition to this, because the truckers had to vvait to
be loaded when rock was not available and while the
opera tor of the shovel was sorting rock, the price paid
to the truckers was increased from 70 cents per ton to
80 cents per ton (R. 268).

POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAINTIFFS $850 ON ACCOUNT OF SPRAGUE'S F AlLURE TO
COMPLETE HIS PRIME CONTRACT ON TIME.

There is no dispute on the law pertaining to the
right of a contractor to abandon his contract under certain circumstances for failure to be paid for his work,
as it progresses, as provided in the contract. However,
in this case there is no evidence that appellant abandoned
its contract because of the failure to pa,y. It is true that
the payment of $4,392.00 became due by the terms of the
contract on April 20, 1950 and that it was not paid until
July 26, 1950. Under the evidence and reasonable interpretation of the contract, there may be some question
of the right to have and receive the payment on April
20, 1950, on which date much less than 12,200 tons of
rock had been broken by appellant. The payment was
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75% of the contract price for breaking 12,200 tons of

rock. Since that amount of rock was not broken even
on July 26, 1950, perhaps the payment made was prem·ature. rrhis, however, is besjde the point because there
is absolutely no evidence that there was an abandonment
of the contract by appellant because of the late payment
and appellant continued to wo·rk on the project for more
than two months after the payment was received by it.
As hereinbefore pointed out, Sprague was delayed
by failure of Boyles to perform its contract of breaking

rock in sufficient time to give Sprague the necessary
time to deliver and place the rock on the levee within
the time limit of the principal contract. This was required by the subcontract (R. 8 and 10, Par. 2 and 10).
There is no dispute about the penalty of $1050 being invoked by the government against Sprague for delay. Extensions were granted by the government for delays
which were reasonable. The Court found that Boyles
was responsible for a portion of the penalty and gave
damages for the amount whjch Sprague was penalized
for the delay caused by Boyles (R. 24 and 27). Elsewhere
in this brief references are made to the record whlch
show that rock was not readily available in sizes to be
hauled to the levee because of the condition of the rock
in the quarry after the blast of F'ebruary 3, 1950, that
the operator of the shovel 1n the quarry had to sort
rock and cast aside the oversize rock and that trucks
had to wait for rock because it was not available. Further
reference appears to be unnecessary.
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POINT VI
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY COMPANY IS NOT LIABLE TO DEFENDANT.

As surety on the performance and payment bonds
of Sprague, the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company would have been liabb if the principal, Sprague,
was liable. These bonds were furnished as required by
Section 270, Title 40, United Rtates Code. The provision
of the United States Code is as follows:
"Every suit instituted under this section shall
be brought in the nam.e of the United States for
the use of the person suing, in the United States
Court for any district in which the contract was
to be performed and executed and not elsewhere,
irrespective of the ainount in controversy in such
suit, but no such suit shall be commenced after the
expiration of one year after the date of final
settlement by such contract. The United States
shall not be liable for the payment of any costs
or expenses of any such suit."

It is obvious that in thi8 action no recovery can be
had against the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company. Appropriate defenses were set up in the reply
calling the attention of the Court to the above provision
of the Code (R. 17 and 18).
In an apparent attempt to get around the above
provisions of the Code, appellant contended that United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Company made a new agreement with Boyles. Neither the testimony of Mr. Douglas
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(R. 95 to 97), nor the Exhibits 27-P and 28-D, establish
anything other than the fact that United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Company, as the surety on the bonds of
Sprague, was responsible for the performance of
Sprague on his contract with the government and the
payment of his obligations.
The trial Court found that there was no failure to
furnish compressed air and, of course, if that finding
is sustained hy this Court, thi:; point will he disposed of.
On page 42 of appellant's brief, reference is made
to the original complaint filed in the first action. This
was a separate case, No. 96365 in the same Court, the
District Court of Salt Lake County. Respondents' counsel is embarrassed about the mistake made when preparing and filing that complaint. It was filed September 2,
1952 (R. 44). The new action, which is the case which
has been tried and is now 1:efore the Court, was filed
August 6, 1953 (R. 10, hack of page). A short explanation appears necessary concerning the mistake made by
respondents' counsel in the filing of the complaint in
Case No. 96365. At the time of filing this complaint,
I thought that the United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company had issued a bond for Boyles Bros. Drilling
Company, covering the performance of Boyles Bros.
Drilling Company on its contract with Sprague for the
production of the rock to be used by Sprague in the performance of his contract wit!! the government and I so
alleged in paragraph 2 of said complaint (R. 43 and 44).
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This was not true as I later discovered. No bond had
been issued by United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company for Boyles but bonds had been issued for Sprague.
This mistake was not discovered by me until several
months had passed possibly because the defendant,
Boyles, in its answer (R. 45, Par. 2) admitted the issuance of the bond which had not been issued. This admission was not true; it likewise was a mistake. Two wrongs
did not make a right and when I discovered my error,
I attempted to obtain leave of Court to file an amended
complaint in that action, No. 96365, in which at that tirne
I did not attempt to state a cause of action on behalf of
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, but believed that recovery could be had in the nan1e of Walter
W. Sprague, who was the real party in interest, and that
the amount paid out by surety could be recovered on
the theory of subrogation. The trial Corurt denied my
motion to file the amended complaint (R. 57). It then
became necessary to file this &ction. Appellant has raised
objection ·to it, which objection has been decided against
it by the lower Court. It continues its objection under
point X of its brief. The so-called positive allegation of
liability referred to on page 42 of appellant's brief is
found in paragraph 2 of the original complaint (R. 43
and 44). This allegation was made by mistake. I have
been embarrassed many times on various motions and
arguments about it. I am ernbarrassed now to be under
the necessity of again explaining it. Explanation of this
mistake was made under oath at the trial of the case
(R. 379).
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POINT VII
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF $292.80 FOR ROCK PURCHASED.
Although the Court sustained objection to the offer
of the exhibits on the purchase of rock (R.. 81), testimony
was allowed to he received on the number of tons purchased (R. 82). The amount purchased was 116 tons for
which was paid $3.00 per ton. The rock was necessary
after the quarry was finally closed to complete the last
of the contract.
The Court required a reduction from the cost of the
rock at $3 per ton, or $348 the contract price of 48 cents
per ton, or $55.20, and allowed as damages the difference,
$292.80. I cannot find in the record any place where
anyone testified about the cost of the rock at $3.00 per
ton or that it was reasonable that the rock he purchased
rather than reopen the quarry to produce such a small
amount. It may he that the trial Judge considered the
Exhibit 2-t-P to which objection to its admission he had
sustained ( R. 81). If this be error, it is on a very small
ite1n and there should be no reversal or new trial granted
hut only an order to reduce the judgment by the amount
of this item, $292.80.

POINT VIII
THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT.
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The Court found that plaintiff, Walter W. Sprague,
performed his part of the eon tract dated January 25,
1950, between the plaintiff and defendant (R. 27).
That was the ultimate fact for the Court to find.
vVould anything have been added to say in the finding
"Plaintiff furnished defenda.nt with compressed air to
operate its drills efficiently~' 1 When it caine to the
breaches of the contract on the part of defendant, the
Court specified exactly what those breaches were. From
the memorandum decision given by the Court, it is clear
that, while there were times that Boyles was temporarily
hampered by lack of air, they were such as would be reasonably expected to occur and not sufficient in time or
effect to constitute a recision or cancellation of the contract (R. 22). The finding and the written decision
should be considered together and it appears that there
can be no doubt but what the Court found that Sprague
furnished adequate compres~ed air to Boyles.

POINT IX
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. THE
COURT DID FIND ON THE MATERIAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS.

This point in answer to appellant's Point IX
1s very similar to Point VIII. Respondents have
no quarrel with the rule of law that the failure
of the trial Court to make findings of fact on all material
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Issues IS reversible error where it is prejudicial. Respondents contend that such findings were made. In the
case cited by appellant, the Court made no finding on an
issue of abandonment raised by defendant's answer. The
defense in the present case was that the plaintiff had
not performed his part of the contract. The Court found
that the plaintiff had perforwed. If this finding is not
specific enough and the failure to find specifically as to
furnishing of air, making payment, and removing broken
rock from the quarry by ~prague is prejudicial, then the
most that should be required, as was done in the case of
Gaddis Investment Comp,any v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43,
27S P. 2d 284, is that the judgment be set aside and the
cause remanded to the Distriet Court with directions to
1nake proper findings and enter judgment in harmony
therewith. Where a written memorandum was filed by
the trial judge in which he stated that there was no failure to furnish air and the finding of the Court that the
plaintiff performed his part of the contract, the defendant was not prejudiced in any way by not having a detailed finding that each thing, which was to be done by
the plaintiff in the performance of the contract, was
done by him.

POINT X
THE PRESENT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN ABATED BECAUSE OF THE PENDENCY OF
ANOTHER SUIT.
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The facts concerning the filing of the original action
No. 96365 have been discussed under Point VI of this
brief and will not again be discussed here.
Certainly plaintiffs were entitled to have their case
against Boyles tried in a case where the complaint properly alleged the true facts and the plaintiffs' theory of
their right to recover. Respondents' counsel thought that
the trial Court, in its discretion, should have permitted
the amendment to the original complaint. The proposed
amended complaint did state a cause of action on a new
and different theory and this was urged upon the trial
Court by appellant as ground for denying the motion to
amend.
After the commencement of the original action No.
96365, when it was discovered that plaintiffs' counsel
was mistaken about the alleged issuance of a bond for
Boyles and the Court refused to permit the filing of an
amended con1plaint, there was only one thing which could
be done and that was the filing of a new action. This
mistake cost the plaintiffs the expense of paying another
fee for filing another action and paying for the service
of another summons. The first action, No. 96365, has
never been tried and when the present case now before
the Court is concluded, the fil'st action can be dismissed.
The appellant has not been injured. It has not been
required to go through two trials and all the rights of the
parties will be finally determined in the case now before
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the Court. The plaintiffs should not be deprived of their
day in Court by an error of counsel in making a mistaken
allegation in the onginal complaint which allegation was
also mistakenly admitted by defendant.
The case of State v. California Packing Corpo~ation,
105 lTtah 191, 145 P. 2d 784, does not support the appellant's position. In that case a demurrer was sustained
to plaintiffs' amended complaint hy the trial Court;
plaintiffs refused to plead further; the case was dismissed with prejudice and the Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment in an earlier decision. The State, in the
case before the Court on rehearing, contended that the
dismissal of the action should not be a bar to its maintaining another action based on the facts alleged in its
original complaint and asked the Supreme Court to so
hold. The following statement from the case appearing
on page 785 of 145 P. 2d indicates that a litigant is entitled to his day in Court even though one action has
been dismissed with prejudice when new and additional
facts might be alleged in a new complaint.
''The dismissal of plaintiff's action, although
with prejudice, does not bar plaintiff from maintaining another acti,m against the defendant
based on the same facts alleged in the original
complaint providing the new complaint supplies
new and additional facts, so that the new complaint alleges different facts and states a cause
of action. The dismissal of the action is with
prejudice only to the extent that it determined
once and for all that 1he complaint attacked by
demurrer did not state facts sufficient to constiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tute a cause of action and bars the maintenance of
a new action on the same facts which were alleged
in the complaint which was dismissed."
The Court, in the same case on page 786 of 145 P. 2d,
quotes from the case of Gould v. Evansville & C.R. Co.,
91 U.S. 526, 534, 23 L. Ed. -!lG, 419:

"* * * but it is equally well settled, that, if
the plaintiff fails on demurrer in his first action
from the omission of an essential allegation in
his declaration which is fully supplied in the second suit, the judgment in the first suit is no bar
to the second, although the respective actions
were instituted to enforce the same right; for the
reason that the merits of the cause, as disclosed in
the second declaration, were not heard and decided in the first action."
SU11IMARY

Appellant has raised many points upon which it
relies for a reversal of the judgnwnt. Respondents have
answered all the objections ::·aised. Some trivial errors
or mistakes may have been made in this rather involved
litigation. The record is rather long. It consists of
more than 400 pages. No attempt has been made by respondents to point out all of the evidence on each point
raised where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged,
but only sufficient to show to this Court that each finding is supported by substantial competent evidence.
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As held by this Court in the cases of Startin v. Mads.en, 237 P. 2d 834, and Hillyard v. Utah By-Products
Co., 1 U. 2d 143, 263 P. 2d 287, errors should be disregarded unless they are so substantial as to affect the
rights of the parties or the likely outcome of the case.
Rule 61 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

ELLIOTT W. EVANS
for

EvANs, NEsLEN

&

ELGGREN

Attorneys for Respondents.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

